The literature on aggregative games, which has been applied in the study of contests, has focused on simultaneous games. We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players. It is shown that: (1) there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, and (2) unlike in the case of a small contest, aggregate expenditure in a large contest is lower than in the corresponding simultaneous contest.
Introduction
In an imperfectly discriminative contest, there is a probabilistic relation between players' investments and prize allocation. 1 A lottery contest is a special yet commonly used imperfectly discriminative contest with a functional form for winning in which the expenditures of the players are equivalent to tickets bought at a unit cost and the winner is drawn from the set of tickets sold (Wärneryd 2003; Konrad 2009 ). The lottery functional form has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) . Applications of the lottery contest include rent seeking (Tullock 1980; Hillman 2013) , R&D contests (Fullerton and McAfee 1999) and conflicts between groups (see, for example, Esteban and Ray 2011).
The literature on imperfectly discriminative sequential contests has focused mainly on the two-player case (see Dixit 1987; Baik and Shogren 1992; Leininger 1993; Linster 1993; Leininger and Yang 1994; Morgan 2003; Yildirim 2005; Morgan and Vardy 2007; Serena 2017) . For this case, it has been shown that the Stackelberg and Nash solutions are identical when players are symmetric (Dixit 1987 ).
In the context of imperfectly discriminative sequential contests with more than two players, Dixit (1987) has discussed a contest with one leader and many parallel responders. Glazer and Hassin (2000) provided an analytical Stackelberg solution for a sequential lottery contest with three players; however, they found it to be exceedingly difficult to obtain an analytic Stackelberg solution for more than three players. They instead determined the optimal solutions numerically for more than 3 three and less than ten players. 2 We study analytically a sequential lottery contest (in which players choose their expenditures one by one and a lottery is held after the last player has made his or her choice of expenditure) with n players.
Although an analytic solution has not been available for the case of more than three players, some of its applications have been noted in the literature. For instance, Dixit (1987) noted that a sequential contest is equivalent to a Stackelberg competition between firms in which the elasticity of demand is equal to one. 3 Furthermore, it has been shown that with endogenous entry and incomplete information or asymmetric players a contest with a sequential order of moves may arise (Leininger 1993; Morgan 2003) . In politics, the institutional structure may also affect the contest structure. For example, lobbyists will reveal information on some issue to a politician all at once, or alternatively each piece of information will be revealed on arrival. Consequently, two different types of contest may arise. In the latter case, lobbyists may sequentially exert effort to obtain and provide information in order to influence the politician. In general, there are various types of contests, such as rent seeking, that are organized by a planner so as to determine the order of moves, with the goal of maximizing some objective, such as aggregate effort.
The model presented here examines a specific aggregative game. Aggregative games are a class of games in which each player's payoff depends only on her own 2 Leininger (1991) studied a patent race using a sequential asymmetric all-pay auction under complete information, while Konrad and Leininger (2007) characterized the equilibrium of the all-pay auction under complete information with multiple players and two stages. Segev and Sela (2011; 2014) studied a sequential asymmetric all-pay auction contest with private information for the cases of two players and multiple players. For a detailed review of contests, such as the tug-of-war and the best of n contest, which involve multiple sequential battles and simultaneously exerted efforts in each battle, see Konrad (2016) . For a two-stage contest between groups, see, for example, Balart at el. (2016) . 3 Equilibrium in a Stackelberg oligopoly has been studied in the Industrial Organization literature but under the simplifying assumption of a linear demand curve (Anderson and Engers, 1992) .
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strategy and on the sum of all players' strategies and therefore this class of games clearly includes imperfectly discriminative contests. There is a large literature on aggregative games and their solution. Within this literature, which focuses on simultaneous games, the work of Cornes and Hartley (2003; 2005) is closest to the analysis presented here. They utilize the notion of "replacement correspondence" associated with aggregative games to study simultaneous contests. 4 Loosely speaking, they replace each player's choice variable i.e., her own effort, with the aggregate expenditure in the contest. This is a direct result of the Nash assumption, whereby a player views other players' efforts as given, and therefore, from her point of view, her investment determines the aggregate investment in the contest.
The replacement correspondence technique is applied here in a novel fashion in order to show that in a sequential lottery contest with n players there exists a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (henceforth: SPE) in pure strategies. We also show that, beyond some number of participants, the aggregate expenditure in this contest is less than in the corresponding simultaneous contest. In view of the fact that Glazer and Hassin (2000) have shown that in a sequential lottery contest with a small number of players aggregate expenditure is larger than in the corresponding simultaneous contest, our result regarding large contests may be surprising. 5 This situation arises because, in a sequential lottery contest, aggregate expenditure is monotonically 4 McManus (1962) and Selten (1970) independently exploited the basic idea underlying the replacement correspondence to establish the existence of equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly model. For later references to the replacement correspondence, see Phlips (1995) , Novshek and Sonnenschein (1978) , Novshek (1984) , Novshek (1985) , Kukushkin (1994) , Okuguchi (1993) and Corchon (1994 Corchon ( , 1996 . More recently, Cornes and Hartley apply this approach in a number of contexts, including public good provision (Cornes and Hartley 2007) , contest theory and surplus sharing (Cornes and Hartley 2002 , 2005 . For a comprehensive review of the literature on aggregative games, see (Cornes and Hartley 2012) . 5 For a study of simultaneous large all-pay auction, see Olszewski and Siegel (2016) .
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increasing in the number of participants but the upper bound on aggregate expenditure is below the value of the prize. Thus, since there is asymptotic full rent dissipation in the simultaneous lottery contest, there exists a number of players in a contest, beyond which the aggregate expenditure in the sequential contest is lower than in the corresponding simultaneous one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of the sequential lottery contest. In section 3, an alternative problem is constructed and it is shown that it has a unique interior solution. The two main results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The model
There are n identical risk-neutral players in a sequential lottery contest in which the order of moves is exogenous. Each player N i  , observing the effort made by previous players and anticipating the future expenditures of subsequent players,
. A lottery with one winner and one prize with a common value 1  v is held after all the players have made their choice. 6 The probability of player N i  winning the prize is determined by the lottery contest success function:
E as player i s expected net payoff.
6 The assumption that 1  v is made without loss of generality.
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Each player i solves the following problem:
In this game, player ' i s pure strategy is
, and given that investments are not made prior to the first play, the first player's strategy set is
Thus, the sum of the players' strategies is
and an SPE in pure strategies is a strategy profile
, where
The contest can be viewed as a game in which player 1 purchases a number of sweepstakes tickets at a cost of $1 each. Player 2 observes her choice and purchases her tickets, also at a cost of $1 each, and so on. After all n players have bought their tickets, a single winning ticket is drawn, and the owner is awarded some prize with a common value. Notice however that in the game presented here, a player can buy a fraction of a ticket. An example of this type of game is crowdsourcing. Consider, for example, a contest in which a firm offers a prize for the best logo uploaded to its website by a certain date. In such a contest, an individual can view the designs uploaded by other players prior to uploading her own. This example is similar to the model presented here, but, in order to keep the analysis tractable, we introduce the simplifying assumptions of complete information, exogenous order of players and a 7 Below we show that in each subgame of the original game there exists a unique SPE in pure strategies and thus each player can accurately anticipate the efforts made by subsequent players. specific lottery functional form. As is well-known, even this basic setting involves analytical difficulties.
3.
The alternative problem
The setting
In what follows, we define, by recursion, a function
. It is used to present the alternative problem, which is shown to be equivalent to the original problem.
The function
is defined as follows:
Lemma 1 specifies the structure of the function
The proofs of the lemmas and the propositions appear in the appendix.
For a given
The FOC for maximization of i E with respect to X is:
Notice that by rearranging the terms in (6) we obtain (4).
Lemma 2 specifies the structure of the function
has the following structure: Proposition 1: Problem (7) has a unique interior solution for all i. Let be the solution of
X is also the solution of (7) 
solution of (7) , is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The solution of the original problem
This section presents the main results as follows: Proposition 2 establishes the equivalence between the alternative problem (7) and the player's original problem (2) and thus, in a sequential lottery contest with n players there exists a unique SPE equilibrium in pure strategies. Lemma 3 states that under-dissipation occurs in sequential contests with n players, and Proposition 3 asserts that beyond some number of participants, the aggregate expenditure in a sequential contest is even smaller than in the corresponding simultaneous contest. We present Lemma 3 first since it is needed to prove Proposition 2 which follows it:
Lemma 3: An SPE in pure strategies of the sequential lottery contest with n players satisfies:
Proposition 2 demonstrates the link between the original and the alternative problem.
Proposition 2: Problem (7) can be rewritten as the original problem (2) for all i, and thus, in a sequential lottery contest, there exists a unique interior SPE in pure strategies, in which the
solution to problem (7), i.e.
* X , is the aggregate investment in problem (2) and player i's investment is
for all i. Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) have shown that, in a class of imperfectly discriminative simultaneous contests, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure 11 strategies. To the best of our knowledge, Proposition 2 establishes for the first time the existence of a unique SPE in pure strategies in an imperfectly discriminative sequential contest with more than three players. This was accomplished by extending the replacement correspondence technique to a dynamic setting. This extension is made possible due to the following: In each subgame of the original game, in which the aggregate investment prior to a particular play is given, there exists a unique SPE in pure strategies. Since this is anticipated, each player, given the aggregate investment prior to her play, determines the aggregate investment in the contest by choosing the level of her own investment. Therefore, in each subgame of the original game, instead of analyzing the original player's problem, a player analyzes the problem in which the choice variable is aggregate investment. Specifically, the objective function of this problem is a mapping from the set of aggregate investments to the set of a player's expected net payoffs in equilibrium. The equivalent problem is useful, since it restricts the analysis to a small set of aggregate investments, in which each player's investment is non-negative.
In order to compare the aggregate investment in the sequential lottery contest to that in the corresponding simultaneous contest, it is necessary to show that the equilibrium is unique. The amount of rent dissipation in a contest is important since it measures social loss in rent seeking contests or the designer revenue in other contests (see Myerson and Wärneryd, 2006) .
In the following, we add a second lower index to denote the number of players in the contest. In particular, . This result can be attributed to the asymmetric nature of sequential contests, since asymmetry in contests usually reduces dissipation.
Conclusion
We extend the replacement correspondence notion to a dynamic setting in order to show that, in a sequential lottery contest with n players, there exists a unique SPE in pure strategies, and if n is sufficiently large, then the aggregate expenditure in this contest is lower than in the corresponding simultaneous one. Thus, by backwards induction,
The proof is by backwards induction. For 1   n i , from (3), (4) and ( 
Substituting (4) (or (3) in the case that n i  ) into (6) results in:
The LHS of (A.2) and (A.3) imply that over the interval   1 , 0 :
is decreasing in X , and 
In addition, from (5) 
is the unique solution of (7) . By applying backward induction, player s i optimal strategy is to invest such that the aggregate investment will be smaller than 1. , (2) can be rewritten as (7). Thus, by backward induction, (2) can be rewritten as (7) for each i , and the solution of (7) 
